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Abstract 
 
Efforts to explain corruption have increased dramatically in recent years. The interest stems 
from the increasing weight economists assign to corruption when explaining economic growth. 
Much research focuses on how political institutions influence perceptions of corruption. We 
move this debate in a new direction by addressing a previously ignored dimension: ideological 
polarization. We contend perceptions of corruption are determined not only by specific 
institutional features of the political system – such as elements of voting systems, ballot 
structures, or separation of powers – but by who sits at the controls. We employ panel data 
from a broad variety of countries to test our theoretical argument. Contrary to recent findings 
by both economists and political scientists, we show that ideological polarization predicts 
perceptions of corruption.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Understanding the causes of corruption occupies the full attention of scholars interested in economic growth and 
democracy. Economists now believe corruption severely constrains economic growth (Mauro, 1995, Ehrlich and 
Lui, 1999, Kaufman and Wie, 1999, Kaufman, et. Al. 2003) Contracts and licenses based on bribery decrease the 
incentives to invest by reducing the difference between productive and non-productive investment (Mauro, 1995, 
Murphy, et al. 1993). Funds for public infrastructure projects diverted to politicians’ personal bank accounts reduce 
economic growth (Bardhan, 1997). Of course, corruption influences politics as well: by short-circuiting the 
connection between the electorate and its representatives, corruption can cause civil unrest (e.g., China, the Ukraine, 
Kyrgyzstan) and is associated with poor government performance (Bardhan, 1997).  Coupled with the advent of new 
ways to measure it, corruption’s newfound importance has generated an extensive literature in the last few years.1
 
 
Corruption is not merely an academic concern. Multilateral lending agencies and international aid organizations now 
consider corruption to be one of the biggest obstacles to economic development. Past World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn put the case firmly: “let’s not mince words”, he declared at the World Bank’s annual meeting in 1996, 
“we need to deal with the causes of corruption” (The Economist, June 4th, 2005:66). 
Recent research emphasizes political institutions (Myerson, 1991, Carey and Shugart, 1995, Panizza, 2001, 
Montinola and Jackman, 2002, Person and Tabellini, 2003, Seddon, et al. 2003). For example, Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) emphasize electoral rules and the form of government (presidentialism versus parliamentarism). Kunicová 
and Rose-Ackerman (2005) focus as well on basic institutional choices made in constitutional design, arguing that 
very specific electoral rules can have a considerable impact on corruption. Montinola and Jackman (2002) find a 
nonlinear relationship between democracy and corruption, arguing that institutionally-defined constraints can 
challenge corrupt practices. Persson and Tabellini (2003) argue small electoral districts encourage corruption by 
limiting political competition. In small districts, large national parties can dominate, raising the barriers to entry for 
likely challengers. Electoral rules also matter: selecting politicians through party lists, it is argued, obscures the 
direct link between voters and politicians, degrading the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable (Persson 
and Tabellin, 2003, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005).  
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Whether emphasizing executive-legislative relations, the electoral system, or democracy itself, scholars generally 
ignore who is engaged in political struggle.1
 
 This is surprising given that political struggles between politicians of 
similar ideological orientations are likely to produce very different outcomes when compared to those produced by 
politicians with diverse interests and ideologies. The lack of interest is curious since ideological differences are an 
important component of the veto player argument to which most of the work in this literature refers. Tsebelis (1995) 
argues that the coherence of each group (party cohesion) and their congruence (ideological difference among 
different parties) is of equal importance to the number of veto players when explaining policy stability. Previous 
empirical work also cautions against ignoring polarization. For example, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) show that 
inflation expectations are not only influenced by the checks and balances associated with the policy process but also 
by the ideological polarization that characterizes the legislature. Because previous research on corruption focuses so 
closely on institutional determinants without considering congruence or coherence, emphasis on institutional 
structures as the predominant cause of corruption may be misplaced. In the case of corruption, ideological 
polarization may increase incentives for politicians to expose corrupt practices by the opposition. 
Accordingly, we account for a defining characteristic of legislative politics: polarization, measured as the 
ideological distance between institutional actors. We provide evidence for this position by estimating the correlation 
between ideological polarization and cross-national assessments of corruption. Parameter estimates of polarization 
are substantively important and statistically significant. We then unpack the polarization variable and find that the 
relationship between polarization and corruption is non-linear: movements from the lowest values of polarization to 
values around the mean have little impact on perceptions of corruption; moving further up the polarization scale 
dramatically increases the perception that corruption is being controlled. The estimates imply that governments 
faced with an opposition positioned in the middle of the political spectrum are no less likely to engage in 
malfeasance whereas governments faced with an opposition at the ideological extreme have no such opportunity.   
 
Consequently, our estimates have even broader implications for party systems, electoral laws, and executive-
legislative relations.  The relative importance of polarization not only stands up to other institutional variables, our 
estimates of polarization are informed by a model that accounts for unit effects and additional controls. In particular, 
the effect of polarization on perceptions of corruption is as strong as the effect of electoral rules on corruption, a key 
finding reported in previous work (Persson and Tabellini, 2003, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). These results 
hold important implications for both scholars and practitioners interested in promoting honest and accountable 
government: institutions do not perform uniformly across time and space. The efficacy of institutionalized 
constraints, the results suggest, depends on who is being constrained and who is doing the constraining. 
 
Our paper proceeds as follows. The first section summarizes the literature on corruption and the rationale for 
examining ideological polarization in conjunction with institutional rules. The second section describes the difficulty 
with previous analyses, while the third describes the variables and methodology we employ. Finally, we describe our 
results, discuss the implications of our findings, and identify a direction for future analysis of institutions and 
corruption.  
 
2. Theory 
 
Most theory focuses on formal rules and their impact on the credibility of political commitments. Specifically, 
scholars emphasize the institutional mechanisms that constrain political actors to explain corruption. Institutional 
structures prominently featured in the literature are electoral rules, rules that govern the interaction between the 
executive and legislature, the number of checks within the policymaking process (veto players), democratization, 
and federalism (Lijphart, 1999, Persson and Tabellini, 2003, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005).  
 
We argue that the focus on institutional rules neglects the interests that inhabit these institutions. Proponents of 
single-member plurality systems argue, for example, that one elected official for each district provides a direct 
mechanism through which voters can hold politicians accountable. Who occupies the legislature is irrelevant; the 
degree to which interests differ in a legislative body is inconsequential. Fans of presidential regimes make a similar 
argument: elected directly by the entire population, presidents are highly scrutinized, making it more difficult for the 
chief executive to engage in corrupt practices. Opponents of presidentialism argue from a contrasting vantage point: 
                                                 
1 The exception here is Alt and Lassen (2004) who take the impact of divided government on corruption into account in the context of the 
American States.   
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independent, unconstrained executives have more opportunities to engage in suspect political behaviour, including 
corruption.2
 
 In both cases, the political orientation of the chief executive in relation to the legislative body is 
unimportant. Finally, others emphasize the number of veto players. As the number increases, the difficulty 
associated with engaging in corruption increases. With more checks in place, corruption is relatively more 
constrained. In this case, we know the numbers, but we do not know whether they represent ideologically opposed 
positions on the political spectrum. Below we present the various formal mechanisms and their theoretical 
connection to rent extraction. 
Political Polarization 
 
We start our discussion with what is missing from consideration in the theoretical literature: the degree to which 
political actors represent distinct political viewpoints or ideologies. The variance in political behaviour among actors 
that inhabit political institutions is absent from consideration. Empirically, our conception of behavioural variation is 
captured best by ideological polarization. We argue that institutional variations only capture half of the core 
dynamic of political systems. The actions of political actors in a political system also drive perceptions of how 
political systems operate.  
 
We test whether politicians are more likely to behave as agents of the public good when confronted with an 
opposition that is unlikely to collude. While Persson, et al. explore this relationship in the context of the separation 
of powers, we take it a step further: we expect polarization will influence collusion between politicians even in the 
absence of institutional checks and balances (Persson et. al., 1996).  For example, opposition politicians may have a 
strong incentive to ignore corrupt practices by the government if the probability of future coalition building is high; 
oppositions representing more ideologically distinct platforms will be less likely to enter into coalitions, removing 
any hesitation to bring the government down. In other words, increased polarization increases conflict between 
incumbent and opposition parties. Under these conditions, polarized politicians behave much like the politicians in 
Persson, Roland, and Tabellini’s extensive form game involving separate branches of government (1996). This does 
not only reflect the impact of divided government as discussed in Alt and Lassen (2005). Instead, the measure 
addresses the ideological distance between parties.  The logic of capturing this element of politics is best illustrated 
with the following simple example.  In the United States, it may be relatively easy for a Republican administration 
to recruit defectors from the Democratic Party to support any given ‘Republican’ issue. Given the greater ideological 
distance, recruiting potential defectors from the Green Party, however, is a more difficult proposition. Since it is 
unlikely the Green party will ever rely on a coalition with the Republican Party, there is less hesitation among its 
leadership and members to expose malfeasance by the Republicans.   
 
We recognize that an alternative effect of polarization on corruption is possible.  In contrast to the previous example, 
there are theoretical reasons to believe low levels of polarization may increase corruption: ideologically similar 
parties may face powerful incentives to report one another’s corruption precisely because there is no other way to 
distinguish themselves from each other. Like-minded parties often form coalitions with one another, but lack issues 
by which to distinguish themselves. Ideologically similar parties would therefore lodge charges of corruption against 
one another in order to gain ground at the expense of their ideological neighbour.  If this alternative effect is present, 
we should observe a correlation between lower levels of polarization and increased corruption. While our central 
claim is that polarization decreases corruption, our approach is designed to determine which claim receives the most 
empirical support. 
 
We claim ideologically opposed groups have greater incentives to reveal malfeasance than ideologically similar 
parties.   Forced to deal with an ideologically similar political party, both the incentive and opportunity exists to 
distribute rents to buy support. Put simply, an opposition located relatively close to the government’s position on the 
ideological spectrum will not serve as a strong check against corruption.  As the distance between the executive’s 
party and its competition grows, the incentive to distribute rents to its competition remains, but the size of rents 
required to placate other parties makes purchasing their support more expensive. Our claim is simple: as the price 
for collusion increases, the probability that opposition parties will expose corrupt members of the government 
increases as well.    
 
Of course, rational observers may expect political actors to make allegations of corruption whether the corruption is 
real or imagined in order to undermine support for incumbent parties. Whether real or imagined, charges of 
corruption can affect perceptions. We expect perceptions of a political system’s corruption to increase along with the 
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frequency of either true or false reports of corrupt practices. However, we do not anticipate a problem with false 
reports as we argue executive parties will refrain from corrupt behaviour as they recognize the opposition’s 
incentives to report malfeasance accurately. The opposition, in turn, would eventually lose credibility and political 
advantage were they to falsely accuse incumbents of corruption with any frequency. We therefore expect parties to 
refrain from such charges in the aggregate. Still, we acknowledge the possibility of an incentive structure favouring 
reckless accusations of corruption from opposition groups and examine the assertion against available data. 
Determining whether or not opposition groups are given incentives to “cry wolf” provides further impetus to explore 
the relationship between polarization and corruption.  
 
The logic we have presented here is connected to other literatures emphasizing polarization’s importance.  As an 
example, Tsebelis (2002) argues an additional rationale for investigating polarization’s impact on politics, arguing 
that three important considerations determine the importance of veto players: the number of veto players, the 
coherence of opposition groups, and their ideological distance from those in power (congruence). In practice, both 
the ideological composition of the legislature and its ideological distance from the executive influence institutional 
constraints. According to this logic, more ideologically polarized systems provide the level of constraints necessary 
to produce credible political commitments. In this way, ideologically distant actors serve as greater checks on the 
behaviour of their opposite number than do ideologically similar actors. We use a similar logic to generate 
hypotheses on the constraints politicians place on each other regarding corruption: with polarization, corruption 
becomes more difficult.  
 
Although no previous empirical work addresses the relationship between political polarization and rent extraction in 
a cross-national context, a number of empirical studies both directly and indirectly support our logic. In their study 
of central bank independence, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) find that strong differences between the preferences of 
veto-players in the government supplement the institutions underpinning checks and balances: the greater the 
ideological distance between members of government, the greater the impact checks and balances have on policy 
outcomes. Their empirical results inform our argument that the policy positions of veto players are an important 
dimension supporting institutional checks and constraints. Additional empirical work on economic performance in 
Russia and the former Soviet Republics illustrates the importance of ideological polarization. Frye (2002) argues 
that polarized legislatures in Russia and the former Soviet Republics reduce the ability for politicians to credibly 
commit to sound economic policies.3
 
 The strength of the communist party in the legislature causes private actors to 
question whether neo-liberal economic policies will be sustained. Frye shows that in Bulgaria and the Ukraine 
(countries characterized by a strong communist opposition) economic growth has been slow. In Estonia and 
Uzbekistan (with a relatively small communist presence in the legislature) economic growth has been relatively 
strong. Note that in Frye’s work, polarization decreases the credibility that private actors assign to economic reform. 
In the case of corruption, the same legislative intransigence that reduces the ability to credibly commit to enacting 
economic reform may increase the credibility private actors assign to important oversight functions associated with 
corruption. The same legislative intransigence that stifles economic reform may also serve to strengthen those 
institutions that constrain corruption. Similarly, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) point out the ways in which 
systems favouring pork-barrel politics might reduce corruption and vice-versa.  Theoretically, these studies point to 
an interesting paradox that has so far escaped scholars: some political phenomena – in our case, polarization – may 
actually provide credibility in some issue arenas but not in others. Institutions that bolster the ability of politicians to 
make credible commitments in some issue areas may not always hold beneficial consequences in others. This 
possibility opens up a number of important directions for further research, both empirically and theoretically. We 
limit our expectations here to the case of corruption, and offer the hypothesis that corruption will be lower when 
polarization is higher. 
Finally, recent work by Alt and Lassen (2003) suggests that who controls the levers of government matters. In 
addition to finding important institutional effects on corruption in the 50 United States, Alt and Lassen report 
divided government (opposing parties occupy the legislature and the governorship) has a negative but not 
statistically significant correlation with corruption. Also, the authors argue that additional institutions may 
complement the impact of divided government (in our case, polarization) (Alt and Lassen, 2005). The empirical 
findings Alt and Lassen cull from the American state governments indicates that corruption diminishes if an 
opposition challenges incumbent politicians (through divided government or an elected, independent judiciary). 
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Electoral Rules 
 
Recent studies focus on the roles of proportional representation (PR) and single-member plurality (SMP) systems 
generally, and various forms of PR systems specifically. Persson and Tabellini (2003) theorize why the distinction 
between PR and SMP systems influences corruption. Individual ballots under majoritarian systems, the argument 
goes, provide direct accountability for politicians, reducing opportunities for corruption. Yet at the same time, 
Persson and Tabellini note that the higher barriers to entry normally associated with smaller districts (a characteristic 
of plurality systems) give politicians more room to manoeuvre. When political competition is relegated to a 
relatively few number of candidates in each district, political outsiders will have relatively fewer opportunities to 
challenge corrupt incumbents. Finally, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) contend revelation of incumbent 
corruption is a public good aiding all opposition parties. Parties are therefore more inclined to reveal incumbent 
malfeasance when they have the most to gain- most likely when they are the only major opposition party. A two 
party, SMP system would generate such opportunities more frequently than a PR system. The theoretical 
expectation, therefore, is ambiguous: whether SMP or PR produces more rent-seeking behaviour depends on the 
relative importance of each contradictory institutional mechanism (size of district vs. district magnitude).  
 
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) contend proportional representation systems offer additional opportunities for 
rent extraction because they concentrate political rents at leadership positions in safe districts. This is particularly so 
in closed-list systems where party elites determine candidate positions on the ballot list and can allocate the gains 
from corruption to faithful MPs.4
 
 It is more difficult for either voters or opposition parties to monitor political 
behaviour in PR systems, in part because of the large districts common to PR systems, but also because of the 
incentive structure. In PR systems, possible future coalition building may prevent opposition parties from exposing a 
corrupt incumbent. Furthermore, Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman argue large districts – common to PR systems – 
also provide a more difficult environment for voters to solve the collective action problems associated with 
monitoring corrupt officials. In smaller districts, small groups of voters more easily organize to throw the rascals 
out. 
Theoretical reasons exist to expect the opposite of Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman’s theoretical and empirical results. 
Bingham-Powell (2000) argues that proportional representation systems generally outperform plurality systems 
when translating votes into either majority governments or coalitions close to the median voter. Plurality winners do 
not often hold views close to those of the median voter, yet are afforded a legislative majority. Consequently, 
plurality winners avoid negotiating with smaller parties across the ideological spectrum. As a result, lower public 
accountability is evident in SMP systems since voters’ preferences may not be translated into acceptable policies. 
Contrary to the findings of Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, Bingham-Powell’s research implies less accountability in 
plurality systems, suggesting higher levels of corruption. In a more direct vein, Myerson (1993) argues for the utility 
of PR. Using a game theoretic analysis of voting rules, Myerson finds that PR serves as an effective deterrent to 
corruption. For Myerson, PR is associated with larger district magnitude, increasing the probability that voters will 
find candidates that both represent their interests and do so without resorting to corruption. 
 
To summarize, although there are contrasting theoretical expectations, recent empirical work on corruption finds PR 
systems are associated with higher levels of corruption than their majoritarian counterparts. Kunicová and Rose-
Ackerman along with Persson and Tabellini also find that very specific rules governing elections are more important 
than the crude distinction between plurality and majoritarian systems. Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find 
important distinctions between open-list PR (OLPR) and closed-list (CLPR) whereas Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
identify district size as an important characteristic (smaller districts are associated with more corruption). Myerson 
(1991)  argues for the utility of open-list PR systems in constraining corruption. 
 
Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism 
 
The broad institutional distinction between presidential and parliamentary regimes represents another main current 
in the literature.5 Some scholars argue, for instance, that the centralization of power under presidential arrangements 
offers executives greater opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour than does the legislative authority wielded by the 
leadership in parliamentary systems(Mainwaring, 1995, Shugart, 1999, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). While 
in presidential systems both the party leadership and the chief executive must approve legislation, the president 
controls certain rents independent of a legislative check, and may even create new rents via executive orders. With 
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this unconstrained authority over the creation and distribution of rents, presidents are more likely to engage in 
inappropriate political behaviour than are prime ministers (Baldez and Carey, 1999). Parties are stronger in 
parliamentary systems, and checks are weaker because parties in presidential systems are not required to organize to 
form governments. Additionally, the uncertain timing of elections may act to constrain parliamentary leadership due 
to the constant threat of no-confidence votes and subsequent dissolution. Despite empirical evidence for the 
viewpoint above, some argue presidential systems are better at fighting corruption. The argument is a familiar one: 
presidents are elected from a national constituency, providing a direct line of accountability between principal and 
agent (Lijphart, 1984, Mainwaring, 1995, Shugart, 1999, Cox and Morganstern, 2001, Persson and Tabellini, 2003). 
 
Veto Players, Democratization, and Federalism 
 
As noted above, recent contributions emphasize veto players (Tsebelis, 1995, Keefer and Stasavage, 2003). The veto 
player framework subsumes many institutional arguments by identifying a key dimension among all of them: the 
number of decision points that define the legislative process. In many respects, the theoretical discussion about 
political institutions falls along this line of argumentation. The ability of institutions to impact policy largely 
depends on how many veto players participate in the legislative process. Veto player arguments generate two 
conflicting sets of expectations. For some, greater checks (more veto players) increase the number of individuals 
who can alter or stop proposals as they wind their way through the legislative process. Consequently, a wider range 
of interests can influence policy by requiring larger, more widespread support to push through legislation. Beholden 
to more encompassing interests, the ability for politicians to generate rents through illegal activity diminishes. In 
direct contrast to this view some argue that a complicated and circuitous legislative process can also make it difficult 
for citizens to hold politicians accountable, ultimately increasing corruption. Since there is theoretical justification 
for either a positive or negative relationship between the number of veto players and rent extraction, we have no 
firm expectation regarding the empirical relationship.  
 
The remaining institutions we analyze are directly or indirectly associated with the concept of veto players. 
Democratization, for example, is a process that increases the number of veto players through political competition, 
constraints on the chief executive, and participation by an electorate. According to Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 
(2005), participation, political competition, and constraints on the chief executive all increase the ability of the 
population to monitor and legally constrain politicians from engaging in corrupt behavior. Montinola and Jackman 
(2002) find a strong nonlinear relationship between democratization and corruption. In the early stage of 
democratization, rent-seeking behaviour actually increases. Only after a certain level of democratization is reached 
will corrupt politicians face sufficient pressure. 
 
Finally, federal systems may increase representation (reducing corruption), but may also reduce accountability 
(increasing corruption). Local elections may provide voice to ignored populations, but monopolization of power at 
the local level may also decrease the degree of accountability. There is empirical evidence, however, that federal 
systems are generally more corrupt than unitary systems.6
 
 As the political pie is divided among more geographic 
entities, opportunities to generate political rents increase. 
3. Model Specification and Estimation 
 
Our variable of interest is polarization, which describes the concentration of political authority and competition 
between the executive and legislative branches. Although polarization can be measured in a number of different 
ways, we chose a measure that has been used in previous work (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003). The measure we use 
was constructed by Beck, et al. (2001) as follows. The largest four parties and the executive party are situated on a 
left-right spectrum based on economic attitudes.  Pair-wise comparisons are made among those parties.  The greatest 
ideological distance that exists between parties in pair-wise comparisons is used to indicate the degree of 
polarization.  The largest difference between parties can occur within the governing coalition or between the 
government and opposition.  Rather than recording the ideological distance among all parties in the system, the 
measure registers what we think is a more meaningful measure: the ideological distance among the four most 
powerful parties holding seats regardless of coalition membership.7 Simply put, the measure identifies the level of 
ideological pluralism among nationally-elected officials. Polarization is coded zero if the executive’s party controls 
an absolute majority in the legislature or if elections are deemed “uncompetitive”.8 Polarization is coded one if 
elected bodies only feature centre-left or centre-right representation among the largest parties.  Polarization is coded 
two in states featuring a large left and right-wing presence among elected officials. It is important to note that the 
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measure is different from simple measures of divided government: our polarization measure does not identify 
divided government. The measure’s added value lies in recording the presence of ideological opposition or alliance 
within nationally- elected bodies.  
 
Polarization scores for Argentina demonstrate the logic of the measure. Argentina scores a one in 2002, indicating 
minor economic policy differences between President Fernando de la Rua’s UCR-Fre-Pa-So alliance and the 
Justicialist Party in control of the Chamber of Deputies. In this case, none of the four largest parties in the Chamber 
deviated from the executive’s economic policy platform by more than one unit on the Left-Centre-Right continuum.  
Following the 2003 election, however, Argentina scores a zero reflecting Nestor Kirchner and his Front for 
Victory’s ascension to the presidency. There were negligible economic policy differences between Kirchner’s 
ensemble party and the allied Justicialists, the party with an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies.  
 
This coding system allows us to test whether partisan strength influences perceptions of corruption. A positive 
correlation between polarization and the perceived control of corruption supports the argument that greater 
polarization mitigates corruption. A negative correlation signifies the need for similar parties to differentiate 
themselves by exposing each other’s corruption. An alternative explanation for any negative association between 
polarization and control of corruption would be that greater polarization actually encourages illegal behaviour: 
opposition groups could levy false accusations of corruption against incumbents with such frequency that the public 
no longer finds the charges credible. In this case, incumbent parties would be free to engage in all manner of 
corruption as monitoring by opposition groups would not be credible. We employ information about polarization in 
two ways.  First, we conceive of a linear relationship between polarization and perceptions of corruption, with 
countries scoring 0, 1, or 2 on our polarization scale.  We also entertain the theoretical possibility that the 
relationship between polarization and perceptions of corruption is non-linear: moving from 0 to 1 on the polarization 
scale may not produce the same amount of change as moving from 1 to 2.  To avoid imposing linearity on the data, 
we specify a model that allows for very different reactions to no polarization (0), minimal polarization (1) and high 
degrees of polarization (2).  Toward that end, polarization is specified as a series of categorical variables in order to 
remove restrictions associated with linearity. 
 
Our dependent variable is the aggregated response to a number of questions regarding individuals’ experience with 
the exercise of public power for private gain, the effects of corruption on the business environment, experience 
regarding state capture, etc. It is compiled by the World Bank through the solicitation of survey responses from elite 
actors within a given state regarding the frequency of extra payments to “get things done” and responses to other 
broad questions regarding the predatory nature of the state. This measure contains data compiled by the World 
Bank’s Governance Matters V project and covers an average of 213 countries between 1996 and 2005.9
 
 Project 
researchers produce a lower dimensional representation of the sources for each country as their best estimate of that 
state’s governance with the weights being proportional to the reliability of each source. The resulting aggregate 
governance indicators have an expected value (across countries) of zero, and a standard deviation of one. Almost 
every score lies between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better governance (lower corruption). The 
original data were gathered from up to fifteen different sources (including the Afrobarometer, Freedom House, 
Gallup International, Political Risk Services, U.S. Department of State, and World Bank) for a given year. We want 
to be clear that we believe each new strobe in the time series provides new information about perceived corruption. 
Specifically, in the data we employ in this paper, the mean strobe-over-strobe change in the corruption index level is 
roughly zero but its standard deviation is 0.29.  
We constructed a panel dataset for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, and 2004 from a variety of databases on 
corruption and other aspects of the included countries to test our hypotheses (starting in 2003 the World Bank now 
collects these data on an annual rather than biennial basis). We believe that each measurement provides new 
information about how our included variables are changing the public perceptions of corruption in each country.  To 
hedge our bets, we performed the analysis using the same model but with averaged data, estimating a purely cross-
sectional model.  We found that the panel structure we use in our estimations is not driving our results.  The 
estimates and the conclusions we draw from them were replicated in the cross-sectional model (see Table A3).10
 
 
We estimate a series of statistical models to assess the basis for perceptions of corruption. We begin by estimating 
our baseline model on 100 countries measured in 1996, 95 countries in 1998, 99 countries in 2000, 102 in 2002, 95 
in 2003, and 50 in 2004. (The full list of countries is provided in the Appendix; 2004 data are limited by covariate 
availability.) We estimate this model by OLS; statistical tests show no evidence of first-order autocorrelation across 
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the panels at any conventional significance level (F=0.54)(Wooldridge 2002). Because we also know the number of 
survey items used to construct each estimate of perceptions of corruption in each country, we use the inverse of this 
number (attached to each measurement of the dependent variable) as an analytic weight. Weights are used because 
each recorded entry summarizes measurements gathered across individuals, across survey instruments, and across 
question wordings. We do not use the World Bank-provided standard error of each estimate (which reflects 
uncertainty encapsulated in this measurement process) as a weight because analytic weights based on the number of 
items used in constructing estimates better reflect uncertainty.11
 
 Also note that our data include unbalanced panels, 
but we account for country-level unmeasured heterogeneity by estimating robust standard errors clustered on the 
country identifier: one advantage of this approach is that we do not have to make the strict assumptions associated 
with random effects in panel estimation. 
The first model we specify includes polarization and institutional variables. Specifically, we control for the number 
of veto players in the system and their independence from each another, for the presence of a PR system (OLPR and 
CLPR), for presidential systems, and for democratization (including nonlinear effects). We also account for income 
(GDP per capita) because low-income countries have a greater incidence of corruption for numerous reasons 
(Treisman, 2000). Bureaucrats in developing societies receive salaries that are sufficiently low to entice corrupt 
behaviour. Low-income societies may lack the institutions for detecting corruption and fraud. Because opportunities 
in the private sector are harder to come by, grey market activities may expand. Determining the direction of 
causation is difficult: it is not clear whether countries with low income generate more corruption, or whether 
corruption makes countries poorer.  
 
We then examine a number of alternative specifications as a series of robustness checks. We first include a measure 
of federalism; we then include controls for additional institutional factors, including military leadership, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, legal origins, and income inequality. Our Appendix includes a full discussion of 
our variables, their measurement, and the sources for the data. 
 
4. Results 
 
Estimates presented in Table 1 show there is a strong relationship between ideological polarization and corruption. 
As hypothesized, high levels of political polarization are associated with perceptions that corruption is under control 
(positive values of the dependent variable). The positive sign on the polarization coefficient confirms Keefer and 
Stasavage’s argument (2003) concerning the importance of veto players’ ideology – here, though, in the case of 
corruption. The results also accord with Alt and Lassen’s findings: polarization’s correlation with corruption 
suggests corruption can be constrained by an opposition so long as it is given an institutional role (2005). The 
estimates confirm Tsebelis’s (2002) theoretical insight that party coherence as well as ideological distance 
(congruence) between actors is crucial for explaining policy outcomes. The number of veto players is not the only 
important dimension to consider.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
 
We also find the dynamics specified by previous work on corruption are contingent upon the way the model is 
specified. The second set of results in Table 1 show that the effect of polarization on corruption is located at the 
endpoint: that high polarization has a strong and significant effect on perceptions – but that the effect of moderate 
polarization is no different than that for low polarization (the omitted/base case).  This result also shows that the 
effect of polarization when included as an interval-level measure is muted due to its nonlinear contribution to the 
reduction of perceptions of corruption.  The effect is substantial – one half-point on our corruption index. 
 
We want to be very clear about the role of electoral institutions here. While we continue to find effects for electoral 
institutions, assessing the impact of polarization informs our understanding of public corruption: a more fully-
specified model changes our interpretation of how public electoral institutions influence corruption. Of the 
traditional concerns regarding electoral design, open-list PR is associated with greater negative perceptions of 
corruption, which is consistent with Myerson (1993). In Table 1, we also find a negative association between closed-
list PR and the control of corruption. Indeed, the effects of open- and closed-list PR system are indistinguishable (F 
= 0.01 in a test of the equality of the coefficients); this indicates a general problem with PR systems and corruption, 
rather than a specific type of Proportional Representation.  Presidential regimes are also negatively associated with 
controlling corruption echoing Gerring and Thacker’s results (2004). The role of democracy and its nonlinear 
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association with perceived corruption is unclear, meaning we do not find support for the findings in Montinola and 
Jackman (2002). We find no direct effect of increased checks on perceived corruption. As suggested above, Table 1 
provides evidence of a positive correlation between economic development and the control of corruption. 
 
Is the statistical relationship between polarization and corruption substantively important? Figure 1 shows the 
density of the predicted values of the corruption index (higher values indicating lower corruption) across the three 
values of our polarization measure. The box plots in Figure 1 show higher levels of corruption are associated with 
lower levels of polarization. The mean predicted index level for countries with the least amount of polarization is -
0.20; the mean predicted index level for those countries with the highest polarization is 1.07, suggesting substantial 
reduction in perceptions of corruption (or alternatively, increases in perceptions that corruption is under control). 
Moving from the lowest level of polarization to the highest is equivalent to the predicted values of corruption equal 
to moving from those recorded by Lesotho to those recorded by Chile. Of course, this illustration is not exact since 
the predicted corruption levels for each country depend on estimates at the means of the independent variables, and 
both Lesotho and Chile vary on dimensions other than polarization. However, this comparison reveals how, on 
average, countries with higher polarization experience lower levels of corruption.  
 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
 
The results summarized in Figure 1 are illustrated in two examples: Peru and Bolivia. The World Bank’s first 
measurement of Peruvian corruption occurred in 1996 under the Fujimori regime, which garnered a polarization 
score of zero due to majority control of Congress. Peru receives a polarization score of one following the elections 
(2001) that brought Alejandro Toledo to office. Unlike Fujimori, Toledo and his Peru Possible party were forced to 
form a coalition with the right-wing Independent Moralizing Front in order to shepherd their economic policy 
agenda through Congress.  However, perceptions of corruption actually increased in 2002 and 2004 despite the fall 
of a corrupt semi-authoritarian regime and the election of Toledo, a centrist opposition leader. In Peru’s case, an 
ideologically indistinct coalition partner did little to reduce perceptions of corruption.    
 
Contrast the Peruvian experience with that of Bolivia, which features a shift from one to two between the World 
Bank’s 1996 and 1998 measurements of corruption. Prior to the 1997 elections, the reform-minded Sanchez de 
Lozada administration promoted a regimen of neo-liberal reforms under a coalition of centrist and left-leaning 
parties. The state’s policy agenda during this era included a privatization program during which foreign firms 
purchased up to fifty percent control of public entities in exchange for investment in the domestic economy. Parties 
in the governing coalition opposed these reforms along with the allegedly corrupt way in which shares of utilities, 
airlines, railroads and the state oil firm were distributed to foreign owners. These parties occupied a majority of seats 
in the lower house, but were not able to prevent the implementation of market reforms. Consequently, measurements 
of corruption in 1996 reflected the perception of an unfettered fire-sale of state assets under the Sanchez de Lozada 
administration. Measures of corruption following the 1997 presidential elections tell a different tale: former dictator 
Hugo Banzer ascended to the presidency, but was forced to build a support base representing a broad ideological 
spectrum of political parties. Gathering a legislative coalition required participation of parties on the left, right, and 
centre which accompanied a decrease in perceptions of corruption in Bolivia. This decrease in perceptions of 
corruption is particularly instructive because the Banzer administration did not alter the previous administration’s 
privatization agenda. However, the likelihood of more stringent monitoring by ideologically distinct and hence 
credible members of the governing coalition increased in 1998 such that perceptions of corruption improved.  
 
Robustness Checks 
 
We also assessed the robustness of our finding. First, when assessing the role of federalism our results do not accord 
with Treisman (2000): federalism is not correlated with the higher perceptions of corruption in our model (lower 
perceptions of its control) (see Table 2). Polarization is robust to the inclusion of this covariate, even though the 
sample size drops substantially. Whether the coefficient for checks (veto points) is significantly different from zero 
depends on the specification of our polarization variable. 
 
Second, in addition to electoral rules, type of regime, and polarization, we estimated the correlation between 
corruption and additional variables representing plausible alternative explanations. For example, we examined the 
impact military governments have on corruption. An important point of separation between the head of state and the 
head of the armed forces is fused when the chief executive is a member of the military. Without proper divisions, the 
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military as an institution becomes exposed to politics and potential capture by interest groups, which could increase 
the amount of corruption in the system. In certain contexts such as Chile, however, the military may be the only 
institution capable of effectively controlling corruption, especially at a level visible to the public (Barros, 2002). 
Given that the degree of corruption may depend on the military’s level of professionalism, we have no concrete 
expectations regarding the correlation between military governments and corruption.  
 
Scholars have also identified ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) as an important barrier to achieving political 
and economic stability  (Easterly and Levine, 1997, Annet, 2001). Extending this work to corruption, high levels of 
ELF can produce dissatisfaction as minority groups will be underrepresented. This may increase corruption as 
politicians attempt to buy support from distinct ethnic groups. Fractionalization, however, could also decrease 
corruption to the extent that it increases ideological polarization.  
 
We also account for the origin of a state’s legal system since it may also influence public perceptions of corruption. 
The endogenous growth literature in economics implicates these origins as an influential factor in determining 
institutional performance (Acemoglu et. al., 2000). Similarly, Brown demonstrates a strong relationship between a 
country’s former colonizers and the development of human capital (Brown, 2000). We follow research by Treisman 
(2000) and La Porta, et al.(1997, 2000) and test the expectation that English colonial origins positively influence 
control of corruption as they afford more property rights to investors than do states operating under the Civil Law 
tradition. 
 
Finally, income inequality may increase corrupt practices.12
 
 Inequality can generate the popular belief that 
distributional gains by the elite result from collusion with the government through corrupt practices. The 
polarization of ethnic, political, or social groups around the distribution of material wealth may frequently constitute 
the central issue in national politics, producing a heightened awareness or fear of corruption (Lichbach, 1989). The 
measurement of each of these variables is fully discussed in the Technical Appendix. 
Table 3 shows that our finding with regard to a direct effect of polarization on corruption perceptions is robust to the 
inclusion of other covariates. The only other competing explanation that does find support, though, is that income 
inequality reduces those perceptions. We note that the findings regarding open-list PR and presidential systems are 
not robust to this specification, and that the effect of checks depends on the categorization of polarization.  
 
 [Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here.] 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We find the composition of the legislature and its position relative to the chief executive is correlated with how 
corruption is perceived across countries. When broadening the model to account for a variety of socioeconomic 
factors and fixed effects, we find that some previously significant institutional variables do not appear to be robust to 
expanded specification of the model. Studies like Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman’s connect the theoretical dots 
between institutions and corruption; those links ignore, however, what Tsebelis considers an important dimension of 
the veto player schema – the credibility of the veto player himself/herself as a blocking mechanism.13
 
 This is what 
polarization achieves; rather than having a system with separated, but affiliated political viewpoints, our findings 
suggest that polarization is a statement about the power of dispute.  
While in one issue area it may be detrimental to the desired outcome (economic growth), our results imply political 
polarization may actually produce beneficial consequences in another: the control of corruption. As discussed in our 
theoretical section, credible commitment and its beneficial consequences may be contingent on the desired 
behaviour. In terms of economic reform, political polarization may lead to wild swings in macroeconomic policy. Of 
course, depending on the distribution of seats in the legislature, polarization could also force genuine compromise. 
In terms of an opposition’s credibility as an agent charged with legislative and executive oversight, political 
polarization provides a higher degree of credible commitment than would a legislature characterized by 
homogeneous interests. Our findings provide a cautionary tale for the burgeoning literature on institutions and their 
ability to constrain politicians. Credible commitment can come in a number of different guises: the same level of 
credible commitment that in some contexts breeds distrust (e.g., economic reform), may simultaneously generate 
confidence in others (e.g., fighting corruption).  
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In one sense, we do not provide reasons to be optimistic about taking institutional steps to address the perceptions of 
corruption. The effect others have found between proportional representation and corruption holds here. Yet, our 
findings imply that designing policy prescriptions to combat corruption may actually be imprudent in cases absent 
an ideological check on powerful interests in government. This relationship holds even after we account for the 
kinds of attributes that are extremely difficult for countries to change: income inequality, wealth, and other fixed 
effects that are associated with each country.  
 
In another sense, there is an important reason to be optimistic. Perceptions of corruption do depend on political 
institutions that are difficult to change; although some institutions change over time, constitutional features such as 
legislative-executive relations, electoral rules, and even ballot structures are often difficult to replace. More 
important, with respect to corruption, is an ideologically distinct opposition. Although viable oppositions are not 
necessarily easy to come by, they can be produced by a variety of means. Given the importance of ideological 
polarization demonstrated above, one fruitful direction for future research involves explaining the existence of 
political polarization itself.  
 
                                                 
1 For an excellent review of the literature see Treisman (2000).  Persson and Tabellini (2003) offer an updated list of work emphasizing 
institutions and corruption.  Montinola and Jackman (2002) include an exhaustive discussion of work on democracy and corruption.  
 
2 Our results indicate presidential regimes are perceived as more corrupt than parliamentary systems. See Table I.   
3 Frye’s argument runs counter to Tsebelis’ claim in that greater ideological polarization causes private actors to have less faith that policy 
stability will be maintained.  
 
4 For example, see Spiller and Tomasi (2003) on Argentine politics. 
5 Gerring and Thacker (2004) provide an excellent theoretical discussion and empirical test of presidential vs. parliamentary impact on corruption.   
 
6 Treisman (2000) and Gerring and Thacker (2004) thoroughly explore the relationship between federalism and corruption.  
 
7 The orientation is given by Beck, et al.’s source material on the party’s name, platform, voting record, etc. The values assigned to this variable 
were checked against the Huber-Inglehart (1995) database on ideological orientation of parties. 
 
8 This method of classification may strike one as counterintuitive since ideological opposition is clearly present in many systems coded “0”. 
However, only a few observations in our data match this coding and our results do not change appreciably when they are excluded from our 
estimates. Results available upon request.  
 
9 The Governance Matters V data are available at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,contentMDK:20771165~menuPK:1866365~pagePK:6416844
5~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html 
 
10 We performed cross-sectional regressions for each year of the sample and found that the results held for five out of the six years: a strong 
confirmation of our results’ stability with respect to the panel structure of the data. 
 
11 Papers that do account for uncertainty by using the standard error of the estimated score for each country engage in importance weighting 
(Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005), which is substantively different.  
 
12For example, recent work on China notes a connection between social unrest and growing economic inequality.  
 
13 An alternative explanation for the reduced significance of institutions is contingent upon their multicollinearity with new control variables. For 
instance, British legal origins and single member districts are correlated with having been a British colony. Using Variance Inflation Factors we 
find no evidence of significant collinearity between these covariates.  It is more likely that the changing significance of the polarization 
coefficient is due to the smaller sample size.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1. Models of Corruption Perceptions 
 
Variable Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  
Ideological Polarization 0.226 0.059 ***    
Moderate Polarization    0.060 0.172  
High Polarization    0.425 0.118 *** 
Open List PR -0.444 0.177 * -0.405 0.179 * 
Closed List PR  -0.433 0.133 ** -0.413 0.134 ** 
Presidential -0.441 0.107 *** -0.419 0.109 *** 
Checks -0.053 0.051  -0.033 0.057  
Polity 0.054 0.077  0.057 0.077  
Polity – quadratic term -0.001 0.003  -0.001 0.003  
Ln GDP Per Capita 0.768 0.092 *** 0.773 0.091 *** 
Constant -6.684 0.921 *** -6.781 0.920 *** 
N 541   541   
Maximum number of countries 102   102   
F 45.26 ***  42.85 ***  
Root MSE 0.566   0.565   
R2 0.747   0.749   
 
Robust Standard Errors were used above. 
* indicates significance at better than 0.05 (two-tailed test). 
** indicates significance at better than 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
*** indicates significance at better than 0.001 (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 2. Robustness Check I: Models, Federalism Included 
 
Variable Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  
Ideological Polarization 0.254 0.057 ***    
Moderate Polarization    0.114 0.180  
High Polarization    0.486 0.113 *** 
Open List PR -0.474 0.198 * -0.444 0.202 * 
Closed List PR  -0.560 0.127 *** -0.542 0.129 *** 
Presidential -0.433 0.120 ** -0.410 0.124 ** 
Checks -0.107 0.052 * -0.090 0.060  
Polity 0.021 0.093  0.022 0.093  
Polity – quadratic term 0.001 0.004  0.001 0.004  
Ln GDP Per Capita  0.814 0.102 *** 0.816 0.102 *** 
Federalism -0.006 0.080  -0.003 0.079  
Constant -6.747 1.056 *** -6.817 1.054 *** 
N 407   407   
Maximum number of countries 75   75   
F 49.54 ***  49.02 ***  
Root MSE 0.508   0.507   
R2 0.804   0.805   
 
Robust Standard Errors were used above. 
* indicates significance at better than 0.05 (two-tailed test). 
** indicates significance at better than 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
*** indicates significance at better than 0.001 (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 3. Robustness Check II: Models, Additional Covariates Included 
 
Variable Coefficient SE  Coefficient SE  
Ideological Polarization 0.217 0.051 ***    
Moderate Polarization    -0.055 0.162  
High Polarization    0.395 0.100 *** 
Open List PR -0.245 0.188  -0.187 0.184  
Closed List PR  -0.413 0.150 ** -0.387 0.147 ** 
Presidential -0.186 0.157  -0.136 0.148  
Checks -0.103 0.048 * -0.069 0.055  
Polity -0.033 0.099  -0.028 0.098  
Polity – quadratic term 0.002 0.004  0.001 0.004  
Ln GDP Per Capita 0.891 0.105 *** 0.888 0.104 *** 
Federalism -0.079 0.083  -0.069 0.082  
Military -0.363 0.289  -0.396 0.287  
Income Inequality  -0.017 0.006 ** -0.017 0.006 ** 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  0.277 0.243  0.210 0.241  
English Origins 0.202 0.155  0.209 0.149  
Constant -6.351 1.176 *** -6.389 1.165 *** 
N 352   352   
Maximum number of countries 64   64   
F 42.38 ***  42.38 ***  
Root MSE 0.466   0.466   
R2 0.84   0.84   
       
 
Robust Standard Errors are used above. 
* indicates significance at better than 0.05 (two-tailed test). 
** indicates significance at better than 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
*** indicates significance at better than 0.001 (two-tailed test). 
 
Figure 1: Polarization and Corruption Perceptions 
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TABLE A1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Public Corruption 0.190 1.116 
Ideological Polarization 0.617 0.863 
Open List PR 0.155 0.362 
Closed List PR  0.475 0.500 
Presidential 0.521 0.500 
Checks 3.120 1.404 
Polity 15.163 5.983 
Polity – quadratic term 265.636 145.943 
Ln GDP Per Capita 8.846 1.020 
Federalism 0.973 0.852 
Military 0.118 0.323 
Income Inequality  41.947 11.755 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  0.426 0.274 
English Origins 0.288 0.453 
   
 
(See the Appendix for a description of the variables and their sources.) 
 
TABLE A3. Robustness Check III: Models, Additional Covariates Included, Averaged Data 
 
Variable Coefficient SE  
Ideological Polarization 0.330 0.089 *** 
Moderate Polarization    
High Polarization    
Open List PR -0.287 0.207  
Closed List PR  -0.511 0.180 ** 
Presidential -0.087 0.165  
Checks -0.155 0.069 * 
Polity 0.005 0.124  
Polity – quadratic term 0.001 0.005  
Ln GDP Per Capita 0.838 0.146 *** 
Federalism -0.016 0.096  
Military -0.282 0.364  
Income Inequality  -0.018 0.007 * 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  0.095 0.275  
English Origins 0.169 0.175  
Constant -6.050 1.693 *** 
N 73   
Maximum number of countries 73   
F 28.09 ***  
Root MSE 0.497   
R2 0.84   
 
 16 
 
 
NOTICE: This is the author’s version of a work accepted for publication by Elsevier.  Changes resulting from the publishing process, including 
peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting and other quality control mechanisms, may not be reflected in this document. Changes 
may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. The definitive version has been published in World Development, 
Volume 39, Issue 9, 2011.  DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.006 
6. Technical Appendix 
This appendix describes variables collected for the countries included in this study. Much of our data was generated 
by projects at the World Bank: The Database on Political Institutions (DPI) and the Governance Matters database. 
The former offers cross-country data chronicling the political institutions of 177 states whereas the latter measures 
perceptions of governance in 213. The data stem from work performed by Beck, et al. (2001) and Kaufmann, et al. 
(2003). The variables we employ are catalogued below.14
 [Insert Table A1 about here.] 
 Table A1 presents all descriptive statistics for these 
variables. 
Proportional Representation. This variable describes whether a state uses proportional representation to elect all or 
a portion of its legislators. A political system is coded “1” if either chamber of the legislature is elected based on the 
percent of votes received by their party and/or if Beck, et al.’s sources specifically refer to the system in question as 
“proportional.” The state is coded “0” if these conditions do not apply. N/A is recorded if the Legislative Index of 
Electoral Competitiveness for the country is 4 or lower, meaning that there is competition for seats, albeit in a one-
party system. We further divide PR systems into open and closed list. CLPR (Closed List) refers to systems where 
voters cannot express preferences within a list – that is, if the position on a party’s candidate list combined with the 
number of votes received by the party is the sole determinant of whether a candidate is elected or not. OLPR (Open 
List) systems allow voters to select their favoured party as well as favoured candidate within the party. Source: 
Beck, et al., 2001 
 
Presidential Systems. This variable designates political systems as either presidential, assembly-elected presidential 
or parliamentary. The system is coded presidential (0) if a single executive is elected by popular vote. Additionally, 
a system is coded presidential if the chief executive is elected by an assembly and can only be recalled by a two-
thirds vote or dissolution of the assembly. The system is coded “1” if the assembly elects, but cannot recall the chief 
executive. Finally, in cases where both a president and prime minister exist, a system is deemed presidential only 
after passing a three-part test. First, the president must be able to veto legislation while the parliament may only 
override if it possesses a supermajority. Second, the president must be allowed to appoint and dismiss cabinet 
ministers (including the PM) and to dissolve parliament. Third, Beck, et al. classify a system as presidential (0) if the 
available data does not clarify the executive’s abilities on the first two counts, yet Beck, et al.’s sources still refer to 
the president as the key decision-maker. The system is coded as parliamentary (2) if the preceding conditions do not 
hold. We distinguish between systems with fully independent presidents (1) and others, including parliamentary 
systems and those where the assembly names the president.  Source: Beck, et al., 2001. 
 
Checks. This measure refers to the number of institutional veto players in the political system and adjusts for 
whether these veto players are independent of one another as determined by the level of electoral competitiveness in 
a system, their respective party affiliations, and the electoral rules employed. Additionally, Beck, et al. employ 
Roubini and Sachs’ Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness to generate scores for this variable. If the index 
is less than four, the “checks” measure is set equal to one since, irrespective of the formal constitutional statutes, 
checks on officials are unlikely to be binding if legislative elections are uncompetitive. For states exhibiting values 
of the electoral competitiveness index greater than or equal to four, the checks variable is increased beyond one by 
the number of veto players in the system. For the use of this variable, see Keefer and Stasavage (2003). Source: 
Beck, et al., 2001. 
 
Polity. The Polity variable consists of a score assigned to each country based on the level of democracy vs. 
autocracy within its political system. These distinctions are based on the general “openness” or “closedness” of 
political institutions as determined by Polity IV scholars through examination of numerous indicators such as the 
constraints on the chief executive, the regulation and competitiveness of participation, the openness of executive 
recruitment, etc. Scores are generated by subtracting aggregate “autocracy” from “democracy” to create a range of -
10 to 10 with ten being the most democratic and -10 the most autocratic for 2000; we rescale this to range from 0 to 
20. Following Montinola and Jackman (2002), we include in the regression both polity and its square. Inclusion or 
exclusion of the squared term does not affect the estimates reported in Table 1. Source: Polity IV data set developed 
by Gurr, et al (2005).  
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Ln GDP per Capita. This variable records the natural log of each state’s per capita Gross Domestic Product for 
each year in the database. GDP per capita is in 2000 dollars and is adjusted for purchasing power parity. Source: 
World Bank, 2006. 
 
Federalism. This variable describes whether the state or provincial governments are locally elected. The measure 
records a zero if neither the local executive nor the local legislature is directly elected by the population they govern. 
The data point is coded as a one, however, if either is directly elected and the other is indirectly elected. Finally, a 
score of two for this variable signifies that both local executive and legislature are directly elected. Finally, in cases 
where multiple tiers of sub-national government exist, Beck, et al. consider the highest level to be the 
state/provincial level. Source: Beck et. al., 2001. 
 
Military. This variable indicates whether the state’s chief executive is a military officer. A “1” is recorded if Beck, 
et al.’s sources (Europa, World Handbook) include a rank in their title, “0” if they do not. Chief executives are listed 
as officers for the duration of their term if they had not formally retired prior to the assumption of office. If chief 
executives were formally retired military officers upon taking office, then this variable is scored as “0”. Source: 
Beck et. al., 2001. 
 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization. Our ELF data are an average of three indices created by Philip Roeder (2001). 
One index calculates scores with subgroup data where available (e.g., Ute, Blackfoot, Crow vs. the catch-all 
“Indigenous”), another excludes racial distinctions among groups that do not dramatically alter linguistic/cultural 
patterns (e.g., black and white Americans). A third classifies racially distinct sub-groups as independent of one 
another regardless of their linguistic similarity. The scores generated are a fraction and represent the chance that two 
random draws will produce individuals from different ethnolinguistic groups. Source: ELF Indices, 1961 and 1985 
(Roeder, 2001). 
 
English Origins. An English origin dummy variable is generated to reflect legal attributes such as judicial vs. 
legislative precedent, rights to private property, and the general rights of the individual relative to the state. As the 
literature identifies the impact these aspects of a legal system have on institutional performance we feel it 
appropriate to include them in our model regarding the control of corruption. In general English legal systems are 
coded as “1” for former colonies and all others are coded as zero in keeping with La Porta et. al.’s data on the 
subject. Source: La Porta, et al., 1997. 
 
Income Inequality. The Gini index measures the level of income inequality within society and is recorded as a 
number between “0” and “1”, where “0” describes perfect equality (everyone has identical income) and “1” refers to 
perfect inequality (one person earns all income while all others earn nothing). If the area between the line of perfect 
equality and the Lorenz curve is A, and the area underneath the Lorenz curve is B, the Gini coefficient is A/(A+B). 
This is expressed in our data as the numerical equivalent of this percentage, which is always between 0 and 100. 
Source: World Income Inequality Database V 2.0a, 2005. 
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